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CONTRACT CARRIAGE BY COMMON CARRIERS UNDER
THE SHIPPING ACT OF 1916*
TnEa Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently decided that the
policies underlying the Shipping Act of 1916 1 required a broad definition of
the statutory term "common carrier." By this Act regulating "common carriers
by water in foreign commerce," 2 Congress sought to promote stable rates and
regular sailings along trade routes essential to the foreign commerce of the
United States by eliminating the rate wars and discriminatory practices that
had previously characterized the shipping business.3 The statute established a
regulatory board to countervail the monopoly power of the regular shipping
lines.4 Tramp shipping-by its very nature unscheduled, sporadic and com-
petitive 5-was specifically excluded from the Act's coverage.6 As a means of
identifying these two segments of the shipping industry the statute relies on
the common law distinction between a "common carrier" and a "contract car-
rier."7
At common law one who transported goods became a common carrier only
to the extent that he held himself out either by words or actions as ready to
accept goods from the general public.8 While every transporter had the right to
limit the scope of his public undertaking either to particular commodities or
geographically, as between two termini,9 a common carrier was obliged to ac-
*Grace Line, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Board, 280 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 933 (1961).
1. 39 Stat. 728 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1958).
2. 39 Stat. 728 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1958).
3. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, 63RD CONG., 2D
SESs., REPORT ON STEAMSHIP AGREEMENTS AND AFFILIATIONS IN THE AMERICAN FoREIGN
AND DOMESTIC TRADE 415-21 (1914) [hereinafter cited as ALEXANDER COmmITTEE RE-
PORT] (recommendations quoted in full with approval in H.R. REP. No. 659, 64th Cong.,
1st Sess. 27-31 (1916) and in S. REP. No. 689, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-11 (1916)). See
ALEXANDER COMMITTEE REPORT 307-14.
4. See ALEXANDER COMMITTEE REPORT 415-21.
5. See McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant Marine,
27 U. CHI. L. REv. 191, 205-06 (1960).
6. Shipping Act § 1, 39 Stat. 728 (1916), 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1958).
7. See Hearings on H.R. 14337 Before the House Committee on the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 194-97 (1916) ; 53 CONG. REc. 8267-68 (1916).
8. 1 HUTcHINsoN, CARRIERS §§ 47, 49, 59, 90 (3d ed. 1906) ; 1 D. C. MOORE, CARRIERS
19 (2d ed. 1914).
Thus the question becomes important as to whether one carrying goods is a private
or a common carrier, and the answer is held to depend on whether the carrier has
held himself out, expressly or impliedly, as willing to carry the particular class of
goods between the points of carriage for all who may apply to him, indiscriminately
and without differentiation, for thus only does his employment become common and
public in character, and the one who has not put himself within this definition is held
a private carrier.
ELLIOTT, BAILMENTS § 124 (2d ed. 1929).
9. DoBai, BAILMENTS & CARRIERS § 110 (1914).
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cept on equal terms all those goods that came within his express or construc-
tive holding out. 10 Moreover, a general common carrier--one who did not limit
his holding out--could not arbitrarily exclude any item customarily transported
by common carriers from his common carriage."' Whereas the common carrier
held out his services to all, the contract carrier deliberately restricted his busi-
ness to a few, and limited his obligations by individual contract.' 2 A single
carrier could act as both a contract and a common carrier.13 When a common
carrier accepted an item for a few shippers only, an item not within his general
offer to the public, he became a contract carrier with respect to that item.' 4
Conversely, a contract carrier could act as a common carrier with regard to
some items.'0 In determining whether a given transporter was acting within
his public holding out a number of criteria have been employed by the courts.
General advertising, a history of carrying a wide variety of goods, a large
number of, or frequent turnover in, customers, all tended to prove a general
holding out. 1 On the other hand, if a carrier had always carried a particular
item under special contract and for a few shippers only, this would tend to
prove that with regard to that item he was acting as a contract carrierY In
addition, a common carrier could act as a contract carrier when he handled
goods requiring unusual care,'8 never before carried at common carriage, or
never before carried by him at common carriage. 19
10. Memphis News Pub. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 110 Tenn. 684, 75 S.W. 941 (1903);
2 HUTCHINSON, CARRIERS §§ 512, 520-21 (3d ed. 1906); 1 MOORE, CARRIERS 19-23 (2d ed.
1914) ; DoBiE, BAILMENTS & CARRIERS § 115 (1914).
11. 1 MOORE, CARRIERS 116-17 (2d ed. 1914).
12. 1 HUTCHINSON, CAmUIRS § 35 (3d ed. 1906); DoBiE, BAILMENTS & CAuIRS
§ 106 (1914) ; 1 MOORE, CAmIRS 3-4 (2d ed. 1914).
13. Express Cases, 117 U.S. 1 (1885) ; United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
221 F.2d 698, 703 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Lake Shore & Michigan So. R.R. v. Perkins, 25 Mich.
329 (1872); Manufacturers Ry. v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & So. Ry., 21 I.C.C. 304
(1911) ; Ney v. Haun, 131 Va. 557, 109 S.E. 438 (1921); Roberts v. Chicago RI. & P.R.R.,
99 F. Supp. 895 (D. Minn. 1951) ; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Henry, 170 Ind. 94, 83
N.E. 710 (1908).
In particular, see Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.-Exemption, Section 303(e), 285 I.C.C.
752 (Div. 4, 1956) (where a carrier was both a common and a contract carrier on the same
vessel). But see Transp. by Mendez & Co., 2 U.S.M.C. 717, 721 (1944) (dictum).
14. ELLIOTT, BAILMENTS § 126 (2d ed. 1929) and cases cited in note 13 supra.
15. 53 CONG. REc. 8628 (1916).
16. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., Enforcement Proceedings, 11 "C.A.B. 350, 352-58
(1950) ; Transportation Activities of Midwest Transfer Co., 49 M.C.C. 383 (1949), aff'd,
51 M.C.C. 355 (1950) ; N.S. Craig Contract Carrier Application, 31 M.C.C. 705, 707-13
(1941).
17. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., Enforcement Proceedings, 11 C.A.B. 350, 352-58
(1950); Michigan Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925).
18. United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 221 F.2d 698, 703 (6th Cir. 1955);
N.S. Craig Contract Carrier Application, 31 M.C.C. 705, 707-13 (I.C.C. 1941); Transpor-
tation Activities of Midwest Transfer Co., 49 M.C.C. 383 (Div. 5, 1949), aff'd, 51 M.C.C.
355 (I.C.C. 1950); Michigan So. & No. Ind. R.R. v. McDonough, 21 Mich. 165 (1870).
19. Michigan So. & No. Ind. R.R. v. McDonough, 21 Mich. 165, 200-01 (1870). Of
course, if this argument were to be followed to extremes the business of common carriage
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While at common law one was a common carrier only to the extent of his
public holding out,20 the underlying policy of the Shipping Act suggests that a
broader use of the term was intended in the statute.2 1 By using the term "com-
mon carriers" Congress may have intended to exert federal control over the
activities of shipping lines with respect to all goods carried on regularly sched-
uled vessels, regardless of whether at common law the transportation of some
of those goods would have been considered contract carriage.2 2 On the other
hand, the legislative history may indicate that "common carrier" in the Act is
to be read in the light of its common-law definition.23 Neither the courts nor
the Federal Maritime Board have ever squarely resolved this conflict: does
"common carrier" simply codify the common law meaning, or does it signify
a more comprehensive congressional regulation of shipping?
In Grace Line, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Board 24 two banana importers insti-
tuted proceedings before the Federal Maritime Board alleging that the Grace
Line was a common carrier of bananas from Guayaquil, Ecuador to New York
and that it unjustly discriminated against them by refusing to allocate space for
their bananas. 25 The Grace Line opposed the Board's jurisdiction on the ground
that the Line had never held itself out to carry bananas for the public and that
would never grow to meet new conditions. Naturally, the fact that a carrier has never, or
that no carrier has ever, carried an item is only one factor to be considered along with
others as to whether or not a carrier has constructively held himself out to carry a par-
ticular item.
20. See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
21. See notes 3 & 4 supra and accompanying text.
22. The ALEXANDER ComlmrrEE REPoRT speaks throughout of the need to regulate
shipping lines and regularly scheduled vessels. It does not speak in terms of common or
contract carriers.
23. See 53 CONG. REc. 8267-68 (1916), Hearings Before the House Committee on the
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 194-97 (1916) (brief on the subject
of when one is a common carrier and when a private or contract carrier). Indeed, the
Federal Maritime Board concedes that "the term 'common carrier' is not defined in the
Act, but [that] the legislative history of the Act indicates that the person to be regulated
is the common carrier at common law." Banana Distribs., Inc. v. Grace Line, Inc., 5 F.M.B.
615, 620 (1959) (the second report of the Board in the Grace case).
24. 280 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961).
25. Banana Distribs., Inc. v. Grace Line, Inc., 5 F.M.B. 278 (1957). The plaintiffs
urged on the Board violations of §§ 14 and 16 of the Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 733,
734, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 812, 815 (1958), the pertinent portions of which are:
Sec. 14. That no common carrier by water shall directly or indirectly-
Fourth. Make any unfair or unjustly discriminatory contract with any shipper
based on the volume of freight offered, or unfairly treat or unjustly discriminate
against any shipper in the matter of (a) cargo space accommodations or other facil-
ities, due regard being had for the proper loading of the vessel and the available
tonnage....
Sec. 16. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water, or other person
subject to this Act, either alone or in conjunction with any other person, directly
or indirectly-
First. To make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
particular person locality, or description of traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to
1186 [Vol. 70:1184
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it was therefore a contract, and not a common, carrier of bananas.26 The Fed-
eral Maritime Board held, however, that the Grace Line was a common carrier
of bananas, and directed Grace to prorate its existing space among all inter-
ested, qualified banana shippers.2 T The Second Circuit reversed, holding that
the Board's finding arose from an erroneous test.28 On remand the Board again
found the Grace Line subject to the Act as a common carrier of bananas, this
time "without reference to the [erroneous] test."2 9 A divided Court of Appeals
affirmed the Board's second report and order.30
The Second Circuit held that the Grace Line's carriage of bananas was sub-
ject to the provisions against discrimination in the Shipping Act.31 The court
accepted the test that at common law a carrier becomes a common carrier only
when it holds itself out as such, and that a common carrier may on occasion
act as a contract carrier. judge Hand, speaking for the majority, did not make
a finding as to whether the Grace Line would have been a contract carrier of
bananas at common law, privileged to discriminate among shippers. However,
the court assumed, arguendo, that the Grace Line would have been so privi-
leged at common law. Nevertheless, Hand's opinion rejects the Grace Line's
argument that the Act regulates common carriers only while they are acting as
such. It specifically discards the common law test of "holding out" as a limita-
tion on the Board's jurisdiction. To allow the Grace Line in its capacity as a
contract carrier to discriminate among shippers, Judge Hand argued, might
impair the maintenance of a merchant marine and violate the declared policy
of the Act.32 The court concluded that the underlying policy of the Act com-
pelled it to look beyond fine common law distinctions.
It appears to us that when Congress enacted authoritative supervision
over the equal treatment of shippers it could not have meant to perpetuate
what so far as it may perhaps still exist at common law, would be an ex-
ception to the primary purpose of the statute as a whole. 33
The Second Circuit's holding thus extends the coverage of the Shipping Act
to the contract carrier activities of common carriers.
Judge Hand's opinion may be inconsistent with the policy underlying the
Shipping Act in so far as it implies that all the activities, whether contract or
subject any particular person, locality or description of traffic to any undue or un-
reasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
Certain other charges, originally alleged, were not pressed or considered by the Board.
Banana Distribs., Inc. v. Grace Line, Inc., supra.
26. Banana Distribs., Inc. v. Grace Line, Inc., 5 F.M.B. 278, 280 (1957).
27. Id. at 284-86.
28. Grace Line, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Board, 263 F.2d 709, 711 (2d Cir. 1959).
29. Banana Distribs., Inc. v. Grace Line, Inc., 5 F.M.B. 615, 617 (1959).
30. Grace Line, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Board, 280 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961).
31. Ibid.
32. Id. at 792.
33. Id. at 793.
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common, of a common carrier are subject to regulation.3 4 Congress desired to
regulate only the carriage of goods in regularly scheduled vessels, where it
thought that competition was incapable of protecting the public's interests be-
cause of the monopoly power of the regular shipping lines exercised through
conference agreements.3 5 Thus, for example, Congress apparently did not in-
tend the Act to cover a carrier when it leased out an entire ship. 3 For in such
a situation the shipping company is acting outside the regular carriage market,
and is in an area of tramp carriage where Congress felt competition would
operate to eliminate discrimination and to maintain reasonable rates. Moreover,
the explicit exemption in the Act for tramp steamers also suggests that Con-
gress did not intend to regulate the tramp activities of a regular shipping line.37
In addition to leaving a common carrier unregulated when it leased out an
entire vessel, arguably, Congress did not intend the Act to cover any of the
other contract carrier activities of regularly scheduled shipping lines.38 The
Federal Maritime Board and its predecessor, the Maritime Commission, have
consistently held that the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress
intended to codify the common law definition of "common carrier."30 'More-
over, the Supreme Court has declared that the Shipping Act was patterned
after the Interstate Commerce Act of 1898 and its terms should be similarly
construed. 40 Under that Act common carriers were not regulated with respect
to activities which would have been considered contract carriage at common
law.41
34. It is only when a vessel engages in business as a common carrier that it comes
within the provisions of this bill. Where a ship is let by charter party to a person
who is to furnish a full cargo, the owners having no right to take goods for any
other person, it is not a common carrier, but only a bailee to transport as a private
carrier for hire.
53 CONG. REc. 13365 (1916) (remarks by Representative Alexander). See also 53
CONG. Rac. 8267-68 (1916).
35. See notes 4-6 & 22 supra and accompanying text.
36. See note 34 supra.
37. Shipping Act § 1, 39 Stat. 728, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1959) ("an ocean
tramp shall not be deemed [a] 'common carrier by water'").
38. For when a common carrier engages in contract carriage, he becomes a contract
carrier of that item and is not, with respect to that item, a common carrier. See notes 13 &
14 supra.
39. Banana Distribs., Inc. v. Grace Line, Inc., 5 F.M.B. 615, 620 (1959) ; Galveston
Chamber of Commerce v. Saguenay Terminal, 4 F.M.B. 375, 378 (1954) ; United States
Gulf-Atlantic and India, Ceylon and Burma Conference (Agreement No. 7620) 2 U.S.
M.C. 749, 752 (1945).
See Representative Alexander's brief on the legal status of tramp vessels in Hearings
of H.R. 14337 Before the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 64th
Cong., 1st Sess. 194-95 (1916). See also 53 CONG. REc. 8267-68, 13365 (1916).
40. United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 480-81, 484 (1932).
Congress repeatedly emphasized that the Shipping Act was closely modelled on the
Interstate Commerce Act. 53 CONG. PEc. 12351, 12448. See ALEXANDER Cotmmrr REPORT
415-21, quoted with approval in H.R. RasP. No. 659, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-31 (1916) and
in S. REP. No. 689, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-11 (1916).
41. United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 221 F.2d 698, 703 (6th Cir. 1955); cf.
1188 [Vol. 70 :1184
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The broad policy underlying the Shipping Act and the structure of the in-
dustries regulated by the Interstate Commerce Act cut against the arguments
for a restrictive interpretation of "common carrier." In the area of railroad
transportation, the relative infrequency of contract carriage of any type meant
that in regulating common carriers Congress was unavoidably regulating an
entire industry.42 The need to distinguish between types of carriage was less
significant under that statute. The Interstate Commerce Act, therefore, may
not provide a reliable guide for construing the term "common carrier" in the
Shipping Act, by which Congress clearly intended only partial regulation of the
shipping industry. In addition a balance must be struck between the actual
words of the Act and the policy underlying them. When a court is confronted
with a statutory term it must often choose between a narrow construction in
conformity with the common law meaning, and a broad construction which
better implements the purpose of the enactment. Although older rules of statu-
tory construction called for "a rather strict interpretation" of grants of power,43
the more recent and better rule favors a broad interpretation advancing the
"objectives and purposes for which the legislation was enacted."'"
Given a policy favoring the regulation of regular shipping lines,45 the present
economic structure of the industry provides a strong rationale for regulating
all the contract carrier activities of these lines. In order to promote the develop-
ment of regularly scheduled American shipping, Congress provides substantial
subsidization for vessels in this trade, 40 and also permits their owners to form
cartels 47 as a means of protecting the regular carriage of goods against the
disruptive competition of tramp steamers. In addition, the Federal Maritime
Board is authorized to permit these cartels of common carriers to employ a dis-
criminatory rate schedule against those doing business with tramp steamers. 48
By virtue of this governmentally protected position, and by virtue of the dis-
criminatory rates permitted, common carriers may have a substantial advantage
over tramp steamers in the shipment of goods customarily offered for trans-
Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 241 U.S. 252 (1916) (where the Court con-
strued the regulatory scope of the term "common carrier" not to include the contract
activities of those common carriers under a different statute).
42. Railroads are almost by the very act of their creation subject to the duties of a
common carrier and only in special circumstances may they act as contract carriers. See
generally 1 MOORE, CARRIERS 115-67 (2d ed. 1914).
43. See 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 6603 (3d ed. 1943).
44. See id. at § 6604 (3d ed. 1943).
45. See McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant Marine,
27 U. CHr. L. REv. 191 (1960), which casts doubt upon the advisability of our whole
regulatory policy toward ocean shipping.
46. Merchant Marine Act, 49 Stat. 1985 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1294
(1958).
47. See Shipping Act § 15, 39 Stat. 728, 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814
(1958).
48. Shipping Act § 14, 39 Stat. 728, 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1958),
as amended, 74 Stat. 253 (1960), 46 U.S.C.A. § 812 (Supp. 1961).
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portation on regularly scheduled vessels.49 Moreover, this advantage may ex-
tend beyond regularly scheduled shipping to the leasing out of an entire ship.
Because of their control over the shipment of general cargo, common carriers
may have a strong economic lever not only in securing special cargo for regular-
ly scheduled vessels but also in obtaining bulk cargo for carriage by charter. 0°
Congressional protection of common carriers, however, was designed only to
promote regularly scheduled sailings, and not to provide common carriers
engaged in contract carriage with an advantage over tramp steamers. And to
permit the common carriers to retain this advantage and at the same time to
remain unregulated would be contrary to congressional policy.
Though it might be best if all the contract carrier activities of common car-
riers were placed under the jurisdiction of the Federal Maritime Board, direct
congressional resolution of the ambiguity in the Shipping Act may be prefer-
able to judicial extension of the statute.5 ' Affecting foreign as well as American
flag lines, the Shipping Act has important consequences on our foreign rela-
tions. A court might be well advised, therefore, to require Congress to confront
anew the fundamental policy question of the extent to which public control
should be exerted over the shipping industry. If there is to be federal regulation
of the contract carrier activities of common carriers, whether by judicial con-
struction or legislative resolution, the Board itself should in each case consider
the impact of its decision on the structure of our foreign commerce, and on
the economies of foreign nations potentially involved. The Board should also
examine closely the possible effect of its orders on the shipping industry as a
whole, and on the domestic market of the commodity involved in the litigation.
Will the contemplated decree raise costs, expand the supply of the goods in
question, induce more trade, encourage healthy competition and the develop-
ment of a national merchant marine?5 The extent to which the Board con-
sidered these factors in the Grace Line case is unclear. Even if they are in-
volved sub silentio in its decision, good administrative law practice requires
that they be articulated in the opinion accompanying the decree. 3
Regardless of whether the Grace Line would have been considered a contract
carrier of bananas at common law,54 it would be inconsistent with the purposes
49. Cf. McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant Marine,
27 U. CHI. L. Rv. 269-70 (1960).
50. Ibid.
51. See Frankfurter, Reflections on Reading Statutes, in THE SUPREME COURT: VIEWs
FROM INSIDE (A. F. Westin ed. 1961).
52. These questions seem particularly important if the courts are going to defer to the
Board's expertise as to what will best promote our national merchant marine. See Grace
Line, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Board, 280 F.2d 790, 792-93 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 933 (1961).
53. See DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 16.12 (1958).
54. For the tests showing contract carriage, see the text at notes 14-19 supra. The
facts presented to the Federal Maritime Board show that Grace meets these tests, though
the Board held that Grace was a common carrier of bananas.
In more than twenty years the Grace Line had carried for only four different shippers
of bananas, always under special contract. Joint-Appendix, pp. 185-86, Grace Line, Inc. v.
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of the Shipping Act to allow Grace to discriminate among shippers on regularly
scheduled vessels.5 5 Judge Hand's opinion comports with the policy of the
statute in so far as it extends the regulation of the Federal Maritime Board
to the carriage of goods on regularly scheduled vessels, although some of the
goods might have been considered to be transported by contract carriage at
common law. 0 Yet, though there may be valid reasons for federal regulation
of all the contract carrier activities of common carriers, the Shipping Act as
now constituted does not justify Board jurisdiction over such activities as the
leasing out of an entire ship. 7 On the other hand, of course, it can be argued
that in regulating "common carriers" Congress meant to supervise all the
activities of regular shipping lines. This approach, however, both ignores the
underlying policy of the Act-promotion of scheduled shipping-and disre-
gards the common law meaning of common carrier.
Federal Maritime Board, 263 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1959). Bananas require special equipment
and handling. They are loaded and unloaded at the shippers' expense and risk, and the
refrigeration compartments are under the control of the shippers. Grace asserted without
contradiction that it had never expressly held itself out to the general public. Banana
Distribs., Inc. v. Grace Line, Inc., 5 F.M.B. 615 (1959), rev'd sub. noiw. Grace Line, Inc.
v. Federal Maritime Board, 263 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1959). Bananas have apparently never
before been carried at sea by common carriage. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8-9, Grace Line,
Inc. v. Federal Maritime Board, supra.
55. See ALEXANDER CommITTEE REPORT 281-314.
56. See text at notes 44-47 supra.
57. See 53 CONG. REc. 8267-68, 13365 (1916) ; Hearings on HIR. 14337 Before the
House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 194-95
(1916).
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